T his issue inaugurates a 2-part In Review section focusing on the concept of mental disorder and the challenge of how to distinguish between normal human suffering and psychopathology, which we refer to as the normal-disordered boundary. Part 1 includes papers by 2 leading philosophers of psychiatry, Dr Rachel V Cooper 1 and Dr Derek Bolton, 2 followed by a Perspective by the section's editors. 3 Part 2, to be published in the December issue, will include papers by nosologists who have written on the normal-disorder boundary and were involved in debates over proposed changes to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Fifth Edition, including Dr Dan J Stein 4 and the editors. 5, 6 Taken together, the 2 parts of this In Review provide multiple perspectives on the most perplexing and controversial conceptual challenge facing psychiatry.
Why should the clinician care about clarifying the normaldisordered boundary? Most negative mental states, such as sadness, despair, anxiety, fear, agitation, and anger, are not abnormalities but normal responses to life's vicissitudes. Mental health professionals are routinely consulted about such problems and seek to help people, whatever the cause of their suffering. In fact, the DSM includes a section of V code (or Z code) diagnoses explicitly intended for such clinical scenarios entitled "Other Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention." The decision as to whether a suffering person is responding normally to difficult circumstances or experiencing pathological psychological processes often has broad implications for how the clinician thinks about treatment. 7 Because there is often an overlap between the symptoms of normal suffering and of mental disorders, the 2 types of problems can be easily confused, leading to mistaken false-positive diagnoses of normal suffering as mental disorder. Making that distinction as validly as possible helps to ensure appropriate treatment for those people who need it and to protect people without a mental disorder from receiving needless or excessively aggressive treatment and stigma.
For example, it is common after the loss of a loved one for a person to experience symptoms of sadness, diminished interest in usual activities, loss of appetite, trouble concentrating, and trouble sleeping. 8 Because these are also part of the defining symptoms of a major depressive disorder (MDD), the clinician is faced with the challenge of deciding whether the person's reaction to the loss represents a normal grief reaction or is better considered to be MDD. Making the wrong decision in either direction can result in either overtreating and stigmatizing someone who is experiencing a normal grief reaction or depriving someone with MDD of needed treatment.
The normal-disordered judgment is especially crucial for research efforts that depend on selecting research subjects who are as homogeneous as possible regarding underlying pathogenesis and likely treatment response. If samples consist of heterogeneous mixes of normal and disordered people, research results will not be easily generalizable or interpretable.
The normal-disordered discrimination has taken on increasing importance as psychiatry has shifted from a focus on severe cases of mental illness in the asylum to today's primary concern with mental disorder in the community, outpatient treatment, community screening, and epidemiologic research on unmet need among the general population. Whereas the primary differential diagnosis challenge at one time was to distinguish among inpatients with schizophrenia and manic depression who were likely all psychotic, the challenge today is to distinguish broad-gauge mental disorders, such as major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, from the vast reservoir of normal distress and suffering in the community that can closely resemble mental disorder in terms of symptoms.
Psychiatry's attempt to clarify its most basic conceptual assumptions about normality and disorder was also part of psychiatry's response to growing antipsychiatric sentiment in the 1960s and 1970s that accused psychiatry of overstepping the bounds of medical disorder and using medical power to control socially undesired behaviour. The issue of the boundary between normality and disorder became of additional concern during this period owing to the push to eliminate homosexuality from the DSM. Robert Spitzer, as a member of the APA Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics charged with revising DSM-II in 1973 and later as Chair of that Task Force when it was charged with formulating DSM-III and DSM-III-R, pushed for and achieved the depathologization of homosexuality. To address accusations of politicization of psychiatry, Spitzer put on a philosopher's hat and tried his handrather effectively-at offering a conceptual analysis of the concept of mental disorder (see Spitzer and Endicott 9 ).
A very abbreviated version of that initial definition was included in the introduction to DSM-III and, with some minor revisions over the years, has appeared in every DSM since. The DSM-5 once again revises the definition in minor ways, but also includes most of its traditional features. Each author in this In Review section will be writing with this official definition in mind, although emphasizing different aspects of it.
The DSM-5 definition is now introduced with the preface that "Each disorder identified in Section II of the manual (excluding [the V and Z codes] . . . ) must meet the definition of a mental disorder . . . [T]he following elements are required[.]" 10, p 20 This makes clear, for the first time, that every diagnostic criteria set must satisfy the requirements set by the definition of mental disorder to validly identify disorders, that is, to be conceptually valid. 11 It has been argued that a basic problem with the DSM is that the diagnostic criteria fail to satisfy the general definition's requirements, 12 yielding potential false-positive diagnoses throughout the manual.
The DSM-5 definition of mental disorder itself is as follows:
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual's cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above. 10, p 20 Despite some changed language, the essential elements remain the same as in DSM-IV. A mental disorder is a clinically significant disturbance in psychological functioning, usually including distress or role impairment, that reflects an underlying dysfunction in a person. Expectable responses to stress, socially deviant behavior, and conflicts between a person and society are not generally due to a dysfunction, thus are not generally disorders.
We have argued (see First and Wakefield 13 and Wakefield and First 14 ) that the harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of mental disorder (see ) constructively critiques and elaborates the DSM definition and helps in setting the normal-disorder boundary. The HD analysis holds that a disorder judgment requires 2 components: a scientific judgment that symptoms represent an internal dysfunction, that is, a failure of some psychological mechanism to perform its biologically designed function-a judgment that is often highly inferential and fallible given our limited knowledge, yet essential to the notion of disorder; and, a value judgment that the dysfunction causes harm, usually in the form of distress or impairment. Each type of disorder-anxiety disorders, thought (psychotic) disorders, mood disorders, sexual dysfunctions, sleep disorders, and so on-are inferred pathologies of biologically designed psychological systems.
Given that many psychological systems, from perception to fear to sadness, are evolutionarily shaped to be sensitive to environmental circumstances, the HD analysis explains why the attempt to distinguish various forms of suffering from mental disorder leads to the widespread use of the context of symptoms in DSM diagnostic criteria, 20 contrary to the often expressed view that DSM criteria are strictly symptom-based and noncontextual. The HD perspective's implications for how diagnostic criteria can be constructed to better reflect the normal-disorder boundary will be explored in a paper by First and Wakefield 6 in part 2 of this In Review. In general, the writers in part 1 tend to explore the value component of disorder, whereas the writers in part 2 grapple with the dysfunction component.
The concept of mental disorder plays a uniquely important role in the DSM because its operationalized, symptombased diagnostic criteria are designed to be theory neutral. Thus there is generally no agreed theory of etiology to guide decisions about what is and is not a disorder. The only way to judge whether diagnostic criteria correctly distinguish disorders from nondisorders is by direct reference to the concept of disorder itself.
One cannot escape the need to identify the normaldisorder distinction by turning to some technical method for determining what is a disorder. Without a prior understanding of what we are trying to measure, no technical procedure will magically tell us what is normal and what is disordered. For example, both normal and disordered psychological processes are rooted in brain activity, so brain differences do not, in themselves, reveal whether a condition is pathological. The frequently cited Robins and Guze 21 criteria apply to identification of normal as well as disordered conditions; normal conditions can consist of symptom clusters, be identified by laboratory tests, be differentiated from other conditions, have a characteristic long-term course, run in families, and even respond to medication, just like pathological conditions. The DSM-5 Task Force aspired to introduce severity ratings that, it was argued, may help define the disorder-nondisorder boundary via severity cut-off points, yet severity of a condition is not enough for ensuring it is a disorder; childbirth pain and acute grief are severe but not disorders.
Most of the controversies that have arisen over DSM-5 have revolved around the normal-disorder boundary. For example, Allen Frances, the Chair of the DSM-IV Task Force and the most vehement and articulate critic of DSM-5, summarized his major objections to the final revisions as mostly a series of concerns that normality was being transformed into disorder:
DSM-5 will turn temper tantrums into a mental disorder . . . Normal grief will become Major Depressive Disorder . . . The everyday forgetting characteristic of old age will now be misdiagnosed . . . creating a huge false positive population of people . . . Excessive eating 12 times in 3 months is no longer just a manifestation of gluttony and the easy availability of really great tasting food. DSM-5 has instead turned it into a psychiatric illness . . . DSM-5 has created a slippery slope by introducing the concept of Behavioral Addictions that eventually can spread to make a mental disorder of everything we like to do a lot . . . DSM-5 obscures the already fuzzy boundary been Generalized Anxiety Disorder and the worries of everyday life . . . Many millions of people with normal grief, gluttony, distractibility, worries, reactions to stress, the temper tantrums of childhood, the forgetting of old age, and 'behavioral addictions' will soon be mislabeled as psychiatrically sick. 22 It would be a devastating critique of psychiatry's conceptual confusion if its diagnostic criteria failed to this extent to distinguish clear cases of normality from mental disorder. We conclude that, to discharge our professional obligations, there is no alternative to grappling directly with the issue of how to incorporate the most valid normal-disordered boundary possible into our diagnostic criteria sets. This In Review presents several attempts to illuminate the normaldisordered boundary as it applies to diagnosis that we hope will stimulate movement forward on this difficult yet fundamental and unavoidable issue.
